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Dignity as Perception: Recognition of the
Human Individual and the Individual Animal
in Legal Thought
Joseph Jlining 1

Human dignity and forms of thought
'To THEIR MURDERERS THESE wretched people were not individuals at all. They
came in wholesale lots and were treated worse than animals.' This was Telford
Taylor, beginning the presentation of the 'Medical Case' at the Nuremberg
Trials after the Second World War.2 The 'Medical Case' was not about genocide or war or the conduct of war. It was about experimentation on human beings; and it was this trial that produced the 'Nuremberg Code' , the first control
of such treatment of human beings by one another.
The word 'individual' came naturally to Taylor the lawyer as a starting
point, and with it the contrast with animals. The connection between what
kind of treatment these units of flesh and blood might receive, and whether
they were individuals 'at all', came naturally to him too.
Taylor's opening at Nuremberg echoed the Nazi representative Joseph
Goebbels' explanation in 1938 of German programmes of eugenic sterilization and euthanasia, themselves experiments. 'Our starting point is not the
individual', Goebbels said.3 He knew that this was the critical point in thought
and then action, and he knew just what Taylor meant later by 'individual'.
1
In this chapter I have drawn particularly on material in my Giannella Memorial Lecture, 'The mystery of the individual in modern law', at the Villanova University School of Law, Villanova Law Review 52 (2007), 1. I am indebted to James Boyd White and Christopher McCrudden for their detailed
and helpful comments.
2
Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No.
JO, October 1946-Apri/ 1949: The Medical Case, vol. I (Washington DC, US Government Printing
Office), 27-8.
3
US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Deadly Medicine: Creating the Master Race (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 8, citing Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The
Racial State: Germany 1933-1945 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991), 69).

Proceedings ofthe British Academy, 191, 573-590. IC The British Academy 2013.
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. With an inversion of a biblical passage that would be well known, Goebbels
made explicit the implication of not starting with the individual: '[A]nd we
do not subscribe', he said, 'to the view that one should feed the hungry, give
drink to the thirsty or clothe the naked ... Our objectives are entirely different:
We must have a healthy people in order to prevail in the world. ' 4
We know the word 'individual' in Taylor's reference, or in Joseph Goebbels', is not referring merely to a unit, something discrete, an atom, a particle.
Moving from units separate but interchangeable to the particulars of the experienced world that are each and always unique does not take us to the individual either. It takes us only to the little pebble or the rusting old car which
there is nothing in the universe exactly like. The uniqueness of a living thing
is just that, of pebble or rusty car, ifit is only the product of those familiar elements of genetic nature and environmental nurture, the two poles of modem
inquiry typically presented as exhausting the sources of living particularity.
Biological parlance has a special name for that product, the phenotype, which
is the current state of the mutual interaction of internal system and external
system. Seeing the individual is looking in reality to something else besides,
a third element.
What did the twentieth century threaten in the deepest way? What were
those who eventually prevailed at such staggering cost fighting to protect?
What was the great twentieth-century struggle about? The individual, and
spirit itself, seen in us in being seen as an individual. The individual and spirit:
they are linked, and their absence together defines the world of those two
books emblematic of what the twentieth century might have brought, 19845
and Brave New World. 6
The home in the secular world for both these, the individual and spirit,
is the legal mind and the legal form of thought. Both these connect law with
religious sensibility and its work in us and in the world-the sensibility that
the human, the human at least, if not also the sentience of other creatures, is
spoken to and touched from beyond the world of the here and now. And it
is the legal mind, rooted in and the possession of people in circles out and
out from those professionally involved with it, that can protect humanity
and the rest of the sentient world from reliving the twentieth century in the
twenty-first.
The presence of the individual in modem law runs counter to the thrust
of what are called 'modem' efforts to understand the world. The individual

• US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Deadly Medicine.
• George Orwell, 1984 (London, Secker & Warburg, 1949).
• Aldous Huxley, Brave New World (London, Chatto & Windus, 1932).
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is associated with openness, each individual new and a new source of understanding by others of the world, 'world without end', as the phrase goes; while
modem thought presses towards finality of understanding, 'theories of everything', 'final .theories'. The individual human being's use of language is a
source of newness and meaning, with translation of it on a presupposition of
identity despite difference-more than presupposition, a sense of identitythat makes each of us a gift to the other. 7
The individual is the carrier of creativity in the actual world. Creativity
comes into the world despite views of the world, voiced of course by individuals, that have no place for creativity, in which everything in the world, and all
thought itself, is the product of units of some sort operating by rules of some
sort, Newtonian or post-Newtonian. The modem future, it is said, must be in
principle predictable as the product of what has gone before, probabilistically
or otherwise, even if it cannot in fact be predicted because ofnon-computability or some other inadequacy in our technical equipment. There simply is no
creative force operating at any level to point to or produce what comes in the
world unfolding before us. But-we see it every day-with each of us there
comes into being a whole world.

Individual animals
The recognition of individuality in animals illustrates what perception of the
human individual does in thought and means in practice. Taylor spoke of the
wretched in the laboratories at Dachau or Buchenwald as not individuals 'at
all' . They were treated 'worse than animals', 'as less than beasts'.8 Nearly
fifty years later in the USA, it appeared that chimpanzees had not proved
as suitable a model as expected for AIDS research, both in themselves and
because of their expense--and also, interestingly, because of widespread and
persistent opposition to their use. The question what to do with those that
remained came to the National Research Council Committee on Long-Term
Care of Chimpanzees, and eventually to the US Congress.
The minority statement of the National Research Council Committee took
the view that euthanasia of some was 'an appropriate strategy for maximizing
the quality of life of the remaining population while facilitating the continued
7
For some exploration, on my part, of the connection between the individual and the meaning of
language, see Joseph Vining, 'Fuller and language', in Willem J. Witteveen and Wibrcn van der Burg
(eds), Rediscovering Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press, 1999), 453- 78.

1

Trials of War Criminals, 27~ .
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production of chimpanzees to fulfill critical needs in biomedical and behavioral research'. It observed, 'O]ust as the viability of the species rather than
of individual animals is proposed as the primary motivation for management
strategies in the zoo situation', here 'the long-tenn viability of the resource
for addressing biomedical research needs should be the primary concern'. 9
The majority, however, observed that the 'phylogenetic status and psychological complexity of chimpanzees indicate that they should be accorded a
special status with regard to euthanasia that might not apply to other research
animals', and that while not '"the moral equivalent" of humans ... they are
more like humans than other laboratory species might be with respect to some
features relevant to the question of euthanasia' . 10
This led to a US Senate Report adopting the majority position and to the
federal Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act
of 20QO, 11 which set up a federal sanctuary for them, and provided not only
that once in the sanctuary they could not be transferred out and any experimentation on them would be subject to limitations more stringent than those
governing experimentation on human children, but, further, that 'none of the
chimpanzees may be subjected to euthanasia, except as in the best interests of
the chimpanzee involved'. 12
The 'best interests of the chimpanzee involved'. The animal emerges as
an individual here, and, I may say, from time to time elsewhere in law even
when the animal is phylogenetically 'below' the higher primates. The individual when recognized begins to block weighing of costs and benefits, justification by relative numbers, thinking in terms of systems and processes,
'at the start' to use Goebbels' phrase. 13 It is this blockage, this shift in kind
of thinking, that is signalled when we begin to speak of an individual 'right'.
The connection between recognition of a being (including a being that is
human) as an individual, and the possession of a 'right', an 'individual' right,
draws on the image of property, the castle or the cottage, security within it,

9

Commission on Long-Tenn Care of Chimpanzees, Institute for Laboratory Animal Research, Commission on Life Sciences, and National Research Council, Chimpanzees in Resean:h: Strategies for
Their EthicaT Care, Managemelll, and Use (Washington DC, National Academies Press, 1997), 88, 92.
'° Commission on Long-Tenn Care of Chimpanzees, Chimpanzees in Research, 38-9.
" Senate Report No. 106-494, p. 2 (2000); Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-551, §481C(d)(2), 114 Stat. 2753 (2000).
12
Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act §481C(d)(2XI), §481C(d)(3);
Code ofFederal Regulations Part 46-Protection of Human Subjects, Subpart D--' Additional Protections for Children Involved as Subjects in Research', 45 Code of Federal Regulations 46.401 -9. The
protections for chimpanzees in sanctuary are both substantive and procedural. The ultimate protections for children are procedural only, coupled with a directive to be ethical.
13
US Holocaust Memorial Museum, Deadly Medicine, 8.
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and dominion over it. A 'right' is said sometimes to dispose of other considerations. Those who work with legal argument and legal reasoning know that
a right is not a thing, bundled or unbundled, that one holds in one's hand in
advance of legal argument or a legal proceeding. Lawyers know that whether
or not one will be 'found' to have a right is determined by argument on the
merits in which public values are considered, 'weighed' we say, and the value
reflected in the putative right-holder's argument may not outweigh the rest.
But in some cases what is represented by the words 'individual right' is dispositive and holds back the arguments of others. No torture is an example, if
the individual is a human being. 14 No slavery-for instance under the Thirteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution-may be another, looked
to recently when the US Patent Office declared unpatentable a proposed
being that would be grown to maturity after blending human and chimpanzee
genetic material. 15 In Canada, under charters of rights, no absolute denial of
medical care to a human being in a time of pain may be another. 16 No human
experimentation without true consent may be gradually emerging as another,
now two generations after Nuremberg17-Article 3(b) of the 2005 UNESCO
Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights provides that '[t]he
interests and welfare of the individual should have priority over the sole interest of science or society' .18
When this happens, in the case of an animal or a human being, understanding what is happening must involve shifting focus to the recognition of
the individual. It is not the possession of a right but the effect of perceiving
one as an individual that holds back the claims of the rest of the world. Nor
is it suffering that does it. We use metaphors of quantity as we contemplate
and speak of suffering as more or less, as acute, extreme, unbearable, or mild.

1
•

I. Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius, The United Nations Convention Against Torlllre (Dordrccht,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), 114-19, 123-4.
15 Rick Weiss, 'U.S. denies patent for a too-human hybrid', Washington Post (13 February 2005),
A03; Aaron Zitner, 'Patently provoking a debate', Los Angeles Tunes (12 May 2002), Al (discussing
part-human, part-mouse hybrid); Consolidated Appropriations Act (United States), Pub. L. No. 10899, §634, 118 Stat. 3, 101 (2004) (providing that no funds could be 'used to issue patents on claims
directed to or encompassing a human organism').
16 Chaoulli v Quebec, 2005, 1 S.C.R. 791. Cf. Case C-372/04, The Queen, on the Application of'Yvonne
Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trost, Secretary ofState for Health (European Court of Justice, 16 May
2006), http://curia.europa.eu/en/content/juris/index.htm (addressing issue in European Union).
17
For example, Burton v Brooklyn Doctors Hospital, 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 881 {N.Y. App. Div. 1982); In
re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, 874 F. Supp. 796, 819-22 (S.D. Ohio 1995). The various utilitarian justifications for dispensing with true consent, such as scientific knowledge, medical advance, or
military effectiveness, were forcefully argued at Nuremberg, and are argued still.
11
General Conference of UNESCO, 33d Session, Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human
Rights, Article 3(2), 19 October 2005.
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Metaphors of quantity appear again when we detach suffering from individual
experience and seem to aggregate it. In utilitarian reasoning, the amount of
suffering of one would be put against the amount of suffering that could be
prevented or alleviated for others alive or to be born. But on any supposed
calculus of suffering, the suffering of one would be a drop in the oceans of the
world's present suffering, human, animal, that is now connected with life and
that only death fully eliminates, and not even a drop but barely an atom when
placed against the eons of suffering that might be alleviated or prevented in
the future, human and animal. In fact, we can see that the suffering of one can
be as great as the suffering of all the world, the point made in the proposed
bargain for the happiness forever of all mankind in the passage preceding
the Grand Inquisitor scene in The Brothers Karamazov 19 and made, I think,
at every celebration of the Eucharist. But in seeing that, we are seeing the
individual.
We can foreground what it is, in law, to recognize an animal as an individual, by asking the kinds of questions we used to hear in the mid-twentieth
century as we were contemplating 'nuclear winter'. Would the death of all
human beings be a loss? I think we would say yes, and not that humanity's
passing would merely be evolution at work. Would the death of a group of
human beings, leaving behind a 'remaining population' that might benefit
from resources freed up, be a loss? Again, we would say yes. Would the death
of a single human being be a loss? Again, we would say yes, a loss not only
to other individuals who knew or individually valued him or her but to the
world, and we express that in so many ways, not least the real impossibility,
the acknowledged fiction, of calculating a measurement or monetary value of
a single human life so that human lives could conceivably come in Taylor's
'wholesale lots' .20
So, in the same vein, would the death of all animals, or all of a kind of
animal-extinction we call it-be a loss? Ifwe said yes, rather than that this
is only evolution at work, I think our minds would most likely be focused
on the ecological and the environmental, on systems that support the systems within us. But is the death of a single animal a loss to the world? To
the extent an animal is an individual at all, we may begin to feel pressure
within and pull from without to say yes, as we do contemplating the death
of a single human being.

19

Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamcuov, trans. Constance Garnett (New York, Vintage Press,
1955), 219.

2

•

Trials of War Criminals, 27-8.
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The pressure and pull from recognition of the individual is there in the
legal mind, and has its effect whether or not it holds back other concerns and
claims in the definitive way it does when torture or slavery are proposed.
It was natural to Taylor at Nuremberg to say 'not individuals at all' as he
presented humans conceived as 'less than beasts' .21 There is a metaphorical
'degree' in 'at all'-and in 'pressure' or 'pull'. But what is happening is blunting, slowing, and interfering with thinking that is quantitative, as so much of
our thought is and necessarily is, capturing in definitions, categorising, unitizing, systematizing, and calculating. Modem thought-your mind and min~
moves quickly to systems, and to units that can fit into a system. The pressure recognition of the individual introduces is instead towards imaginative
escapes, reconfigurations, compromises that are temporary, facing the tragic
in tragic choices made, and moving into the world of remorse, forgiveness,
and beginning again to which calculation is utterly foreign.
The effect is easily seen, familiar really, in criminal law both as formulated and as applied. Judges, prosecutors, juries, legislators all feel it. The
classic holding back of what is proposed to be done to a human convict for
purposes of general deterrence, the insistence that a criminal sanction be
linked in some proportional way to the mind condemned, is a turning of
decisional attention to the individual who is at the mercy of the decisionmaker. When we say the 'retributive' purpose of a criminal sanction limits its
utilitarian use, it is this to which we are referring. Procedure and procedural
choices are affected throughout criminal law, as are the placing and relative heaviness of burdens of proof. ' Strict' or 'vicarious' criminal liability
introduced in the aptly named public policy offences, apparently eliminating any inquiry at all into the mind and particular situation of an individual
before criminal condemnation, is demonstrably moulded into liability that is
neither strict nor vicarious. The more serious the proposed suffering of the
individual, the greater is insistence on such inquiry, constitutionally pushed
by the very notion of 'law' in 'due process of law' and in the USA by the
constitutional word 'cruel'.
Then, on the animal side: in criminal law, inquiry into the justification
for the actions of human beings accused of the felony of animal cruelty is
pulled and moulded by the suffering of animals without regard to number.
Medical and scientific experimentation is institutionalized and regulated by
statute. In the USA the legal mandate runs to federal mini-agencies called
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees, established to approve or
disapprove research proposals and 'represent society's concerns regarding
11

Trials of War Criminals, 27-8 {emphasis added).
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the welfare of animal subjects' .22 It is a mandate to researchers as well, and
it focuses on individual animals. The absolute number of animals suffering
is to be reduced to the lowest number possible, not the percentage of the
kind but the absolute number. Experimental technique and procedure are to
be refined to lessen each animal's suffering. Then, as a training manual for
members of the enforcement committees instructs, '[f]inally, there comes a
point in a number of research studies in which further pain and suffering by
the animal is unjustified, no matter how noble the cause. It is the [committee's] role to recognize when this point bas come and end the research trial
at this time.'23
In Canadian and US trusts and estates law, an animal moves on its owner's death out from under the general law of property and into the world of
wills acts and probate codes. There are now cases in which courts have voided
an order put into a will to destroy an animal left behind, fashioning something like a temporary judicial sanctuary for it, when a challenge to the order
as against basic legal values is brought by an executor or an intervenor or,
indeed, by the state attorney general. 24 The Uniform Trust Code in the USA
now provides for trusts for an animal effective for its life, in which the animal
is an equitable beneficiary, and persons interested in the animal's welfare are
given standing to intervene and seek enforcement of the terms of the trust.25
Time and again attention is paid to the individual animal, quite apart from any
ecological, environmental, or species-preservation concerns. It is recognized,
it presses, as if in law it can look you directly in the eye.
Consideration of the individual animal can help us focus upon and titrate
out, as it were, the third element to which I have referred. What evokes the
human response of 'respect' is not entirely contained in what we call 'the
n 7 United States Code §§2132(n), 2143(b)(1) ('Animal Welfare Act' of 1966 as amended); Congressional Finding (4) for Pub. L. No. 99--198, §§2142-6, 99 Stat. 1645 (1985).
23
Sally K. Wixson, 'The role of the IACUC in assessing and managing pain and distress in research
animals', in M. Lawrence Podolsky and Victor S. Lukas (eds), The Care and Feeding of an IA CUC:
The Orga11ization arui Management ofan Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (Boca Raton,
FL, CRC Press, 1999), 115, 117. The Animal Welfare Act itselfnow prohibits, for any animal it covers,
surgery using paralytics without anesthetics. The prohibition is absolute, without regard to motive or
context 7 United States Code §2143(aX3XC)(iv) (1985).
24
For example, Capers Estate, 340 D. and C.2d 121, 135-38 (Orphan's Court PA, 1964); In the Matter
of the Estate of Clive Wishart, 129 N.B.R.(2d) 397, 401-2, 408-9, 412-24 (New Bnmswick Court
of Queen's Bench [Canada], 1992), reviewing both US and Canadian law. For discussion, see Sonia
S. WaislDllll, Pamela D. Frasch and Bruce A. Wagman, Animal Law: Cases and Materials, 3rd edn
(Durham, NC, Carolina Academic Press, 2006), 587- 98 .
.,, Uniform Trust Code (United States) §408 (2005); Official Commentary to §408 ('The concept of
granting standing to a person with a demonsttated interest in the animal's welfare is derived from the
Uniform Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, which allows a person interested in the we!·
fare of a ward or protected person to file petitions on behalf of the ward or protected person'.)
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human'. 'The individual' is not merely an expression of human self-regard.
Noting this can uncouple us somewhat from the growing question about what
is human and what is not, being raised by experimental work with embryonic
stem cells, genetic engineering, and the hybridization of human and animal
systems. It can even buffer us from the impossible question of relative degrees
of human-likeness in legal categorizations of animals based on likenesses
between human and animal physical systems, which is cousin to the impossible question of degrees of perfection within humanness in current eugenic
discussion of 'selection in' or 'termination' using the tools of reproductive
technology.

The individual and the person
Consideration of the individual that is an animal also pulls us away from mistalcing the recognition and experience of the individual for the experience
of persons. An animal may be an individual but not a person. On the human
side, a slave may be property, a thing bought and sold, flogged and kicked,
not a citizen or a legal person, thought even to be 'not fully human', but a
slave presses nonetheless for entry into the perceived world as an individual. 26
To allude again to the biological manipulation that is now possible, the temporal line often drawn between using a developing human unit in scientific
experimentation, and staying the hand at using it in experimentation, is the
fourteenth day of embryonic development.27 One of the reasons advanced for
that line is the possibility of twinning before fourteen days and the challenge
it may pose to perception of an individual until that possibility is past.28 For
many who would adopt that line, the individual after fourteen days is not yet
a person. Then at the end of life, the person may fade away. The individual

u For a sweeping examination of the nonnality of slavery before the recent past, and of what is seen
when a slave is seen, and for the history of the development of perception leading to a prohibition of
slavery that is 'absolute', see John T. Noonan Jr, A Ch11rch that Can and Cannot Change: The Development ofCatholic Moral Teaching (South Bend, TN, University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 3- 123.
ri Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, chapter 37, §3(3). (4) (Great Britain); National
Research Council and Institute of Medicine. Guidelines for H11man Embryonic Stem Cell Research
(Washington DC, National Academies Press, 2005), 57 (United States).
21
National Institutes of Health, Report ofthe H11man Embryo Research Panel, vol. 1 (Bethesda, MD,
National Institutes of Health, 1994), 45-7, 65, 67; Anthony Kenny, 'Life stories: when an individual
life be~d the ethics of ending it', 1lmes Literary Supplement (25 March 2005), 3, 4 (quoting
from Parliamentary Debates, 6th Ser., vol. 73, 15 February 1985, 682, remarks to the House of Commons by Kenneth Clarke, Minister for Health in Great Britain). The fourtecn-<lay point is also the
point after which appear 'the precursors of the brain and central nervous system'. National Research
Council and Institute of Medicine, Guidelines, 55.
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stays-whom you do not experiment on or 'harvest' from-though the person
fades. The individual is centred on the flesh, though that is something with
which we do struggle, the continuing challenge of gnosticism in Christianity
being only a more than usually clear example of struggle with it. 29
Questions about how to use the terms 'individual' and 'person' are
unsettled, but the terms as used do reflect an underlying sense of the difference between a person and an individual, indeed the difference between a
person centred on an individual's body and the individual enfleshed there.30
A person, both in mundane or ordinary or daily or unself-conscious talk,
and in the considered language of law, may be enfleshed. But a person need
not be enfleshed and can speak through one or another individual. We can
and do take on various legal identities without losing our individuality: they
are not identities all our own. Persons join us together, and the standard
assumption, that one can always be challenged when one speaks on behalf
of a person who is not an individual, is evidence of such joining rather than
separation. Identification with persons who are not individuals is what links
us, in a real way, to future individuals beyond our span oflife, even the distant future, with responsibility to them and hope for them. It is what links
us, in obligation and gratitude, to individuals before our individual time,
indeed what makes the past even relevant and interesting to us so that we are
willing to spend precious individual time, the most wasting resource there
is, working to determine what is authentic in our understanding of the past,
and what is unreal.
As for the 'individual person', this is mutually developed in our conscious and unconscious understanding and experience over time. Other individuals continually sift and sort through what an individual says and does as
an individual, identifying it with him or her as a person who exists over time,
or putting it aside as mistake or inauthentic. We do the same with ourselves,
doubting or trusting, persuading ourselves and believing. We sit in judgment
on what we ourselves say and do.
The person perceived or heard is 'half-created' over time, real and alive
to us because of our work, something of our own. The individual is always
in the present. If time moves or if one moves through time, the individual is
always with us. Anything said is always in the past, immediately so, evidence
with which we work, but evidence only, not the same as what it is evidence
l9

Philip 1. Lee, Against the Protestant Gnostics (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993}; Walter
Brueggemann, Praying the Psalms, 2nd edn (Eugene, OR, Cascade Books, 2007}.
30
I first worked on these problems, against the background of twentieth-century developments in
'standing', in Joseph Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law (New Haven, Yale
University Press, 1978), 2-3, 6-7, 145--8, 179--81.
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of. The individual here and now is silent and lives with us in silence. As 'starting point', the individual always remains central. The person prevents the
individual as starting point, this ongoing centrality, from ending in radical
ignorance and isolation, solipsism and relativism.31

Articulating perception
But again, the third element, beyond systems internal and external, is what
gives the individual its distinctive force in perception and action. This is what
so demands to be fitted into our ongoing effort to put together the bits and
pieces of our experience into a coherence that does not close the eyes to any
of it. Without this third element, the individual's place in the worlds of other
individuals would not be begun to be understood. Even ifthere is no real possibility-precisely because of the recognition of the individual-of anyone's
tying up understanding of individuality into a finished package by the end of
his or her life in the world, still our trying to articulate the perception on which
we act can serve a purpose. It helps each of us in opening a door, moving to
the side of systems in general, and stepping once more into the parts of the
mind where quantification and calculation lose purchase.
Some might reach for the term used in professional philosophy, 'agency',
to refer to this third element. But agency is too pale and neutral a term to
evoke the force that recognition of the individual has, and this is because
agency in its connotations remains attached to its origins in philosophic discussion and to language there that speaks of properties of units and emergent
properties of systems of units, envisioning capturing all parts of experience,
unitizing them so that they can be put in classes and groups of the same, and
then manipulating them in ways logical or otherwise-rather than listening to
them. Agents need not call as individuals do, appeal, stop, reveal as individuals do. Agency tames experience.
What to call the third element? The American pragmatist Richard Rorty
summed up in the most wonderful way much of what we try to talk about in
his response to a 1999 request for reflections upon the coming third millennium. He looked to 'accomplishing' a 'thorough-going secularization' before
the fourth millennium. 'It will probably talce ', he said, 'at least a thousand
years for human beings to give up the last remnants of the idea that they
31

'Half-create' is Wordsworth's-'all the mighty world/Of eye and ear, both what they half-create,!
And what perceive'. William Wordsworth, 'Lines written a few miles above Tintem Abbey', in Stephen Gill (ed.), William Wordsworth: The Major Works (New York, Oxford University Press, 2000),
134.
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contain a spark of the divine: to see Beethoven and Jefferson as animals with
extra neurons. ' 32 He went on to speak of individuals in modern history who
have 'unwittingly collaborated with each other . .. to force us' to this conclusion about the nature of the sources oflife and thought given us when we enter
the world for our time in it. Rorty, so oblivious, it seems, to the phenomenon
of human law and its recognitions, and so oblivious to what might be his own
commitment to law's recognitions, and certainly his dependence on them in
his life taken as a whole, calls the third element a ' spark of the divine' in denying it to both human and animal.
We have called the third element spirit here, rather than spark of the
divine. Sparks go out, spirit continues. Sparks are units, spirit is not capturable. And it is because spirit is not capturable and is not predictable, ahd takes
form in the human world in language the meaning of which is the meaning of
its utterer and itself irreducible to any system, that spirit stands against the full
thrust of thought that is distinctively twentieth century.
Not against thought of a religious kind, that continued through the
century, not against legal thought, that has if anything flourished33 and
become more central to human life as the number of human individuals
has increased, and not against ' ordinary' thought of 'ordinary' individuals:
spirit stands against thought that, because in its own terms it has no place for
spirit, would squeeze spirit out from thought itself, against elite, informed
thought that views success in manipulating the systems of the world to
human ends as authority to teach the nature of the world as a whole. Distinctively twentieth-century thought is cosmological, agitatedly and aggressively so, and thus for many, not most but many, one aspect of the mystery
of the individual in modem law is the individual being there at all after the
twentieth century.
Full recognition of the individual human being may be described, and I
think in a way not inconsistent with spirit being the third element, as accepting into one's world something analogous to the acceptance of the Big Bang
into physics and into contemplation of the physical world. The individual is a
singularity, a word nicely taken over by physicists from their own experience
of being individuals- not a unit playing a part in the working of rules and
quantities governed by rules. Each individual has a view of the reality of the
world, the cosmos itself, that cannot be different from his or her view. One
32
Richard Rorty, 'International books of the year-41nd the millennium', 1imes Literary Supplement
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31
Steven D. Smith, Law:S Quandary (Cambridge, MA, Harvard Univenity Press, 2004). See Steven
D. Smith, The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press,
2010), 205-10, for further discussion of'spirit' as used here.
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cannot say, 'I see the world in this way or see this in the world, but what I see
is mistaken or an illusion.' One sees it the way one sees it. One can struggle
with doubt and be open to change if open-minded and working with perceptions that themselves open out into the new and surprising. But one cannot
truthfully say to another, 'The way you see the world is true, not the way I see
the world.' Even if one hears oneself saying such a thing, the world remains
the way one sees it, and another individual, who is only one, trying to dismiss
it with the word 'solipsism', is merely denying that one is an individual like
himself or herself.
When individuals are recognized by one another they acknowledge this
sense on the part of each that each is at the centre of the world. The 'public' value of an individual life is bedrock-natural rather than a mysterious
anomaly. 'Not for all the world', we say, and thought of 'all the world' and
reference to 'all the world' is a quite understandable and common response
to a proposal that something be done to an individual, a meaningful response,
not hyperbole or nonsense. It is this ontological or cosmological sense, not of
the smallness of the individual among the billions but of the largeness of the
individual up to the level of the largeness of the world itself, that lies behind
the blocking or blunting or continuous creative compromise with the kind of
thinking, often called rational, that must work with fungible units. Since each
ofus is an individual, a cosmology that has a place for us will always be truer,
or closer to truth, or have a greater claim to truth, than any cosmology that
does not.
All this comes before and is not supplanted by the joining of individuals
in persons and in the experience of living value. The first question of understanding each of us faces is not how can I be an individual or how could there
possibly be an individual, but how can there be more than individuals, as there
is, and how, in what can only be continuous acts of generosity, do we each see
we are one among many?
However paradoxical such a sense of reality or such a cosmology may
appear to be, and whatever the way it differs from consistently radical subjectivity on the one hand and consistently impersonal objectivity on the other,
this is the sense of reality displayed to each of us individuals in the practice of
law, expressed by law, making law possible, underlying what lawyers do. As
Stephen R. L. Clark says so nicely of objectifying visions:
Fortunately-<>r providentially--0ur own sense of self, and our sense of significant others as individual selves, keeps breaking in. Our attention is always
being drawn to individuals as something more than episodes or anecdotes
within a single story. Instead of one world, there are, in a way, very many
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though each unitary world experiences itself as a fragment or an echo of the
wider realm. l 4

Trinitarian Christianity has its words for this, and in its ecumenical reach
seeks to understand the words for it in other enduring religious teachings. It
is an ontology that, in addition to recognizing the world of each individual,
recognizes faith in a reality beyond the worlds of each individual, which
each of us is a new window on and from and for which each of us is a voice
when we are, as we say, 'really' ourselves, authentic, not pretending, not
false-a reality in which move the persons who join us and who are halfcreated by us all, but only half-created-a reality on which our individual
action, each of us one among the billions, may have a causal effect neither
we nor anyone else can trace.
But all this, internal system, external system, the third element that moves
a unique unit to individuality, the individual person and the person we halfcreate-all can be put aside, and still the individual remains. Happily or
unhappily, anything I or anyone may say in description of the individual, or
of the place of the individual in thought, is soft when it comes up against the
hard reality of the individual. The world just is as you see it and not otherwise.
When you speak about anything (including about the individual), you just are
only one speaking. I am and you are prior to our understanding. The past does
not produce us-we come before the past. The existence, nature, and effects
of the past are matters for our individual judgment or persuasion throughout
our lives. Whatever may be thought generally of creation, we each are created,
for there is no other language of understanding that begins to reach us as individuals. The current language of emergent properties or of complex adaptive
systems certainly does not.

Imaging dignity
Is spirit what is recognized in an animal also? Is it spirit or an analogue that
should be given a different name? The third element that moves an animal to
individuality, with effects on human action similar to those implied whenever
we speak of human dignity, may not be the same as the third element in the
human. But as we have noted, the line between what is human and what is not
may also be less and less secure as experimentation in genetics proceeds. Depending upon how strong in our own minds the connection between genetic
34
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patterns and being human is, the phrase 'dignity simply by virtue of being a
human being' may lose some of its ontological support and usefulness as an
articulation of perception. Dignity can in fact already be found used in various
legal contexts in connection with an animaPs-again, an animal and indeed a
human being need not be a 'legal person' to be seen to be an individual.
Currently, much of what is perceived and seeks expression clusters around
an animal's sentience, which is a legal term as much as it is a term in ordinary
speech or in scientific investigation,36 and which doubles as expression of a
line between animals that are seen as individuals and animals that are not. The
relation between an animal's sentience and our spirit remains to be seen. We
have only begun to open our eyes to the creatures around us.
A book I published several years ago had the title The Song Sparrow and
the Child, 37 with Claims ofScience and Humanity as its subtitle. I contrasted
the song sparrow with the child throughout, and then at the end touched on the
question how great the difference really was and how long the difference wi11
continue in our perception, thought, and action.
Once, while I was working on the book, I opened the US National Science Foundation's webpage setting out the call of scientific work, and there
a song sparrow was on the screen, the first thing seen, with a reference to
investigation of its neurobiological mechanisms.38 Some of the methods of
investigation are brutal. What is done to a song sparrow would not be done
to a child today-though the twentieth century witnessed such things done to
children where the individual was obscured from view. Song sparrows are of
Js Christopher McCrudden, 'Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights', European
Journal ofInternational Law 19 {2008), 708-9 {legal use of' dignity' also with reference to animals).
u Maine Revised Statute Annotated title 7 §3907 (2001) (United States) ("'Animal" means every living, sentient creature not a human being.'); Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European
Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities, and certain related acts: Protocol on
protection and welfare of animals annexed to the Treaty of the European Community Protocol, Official
Journal C340, 10/11/1997, 0110 {'The high contracting parties, desiring to ensure improved protection and respect for the welfare of animals as sentient beings, 'have agreed .. . '). See Simon Conway
Morris, Life~ Solution (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003), a detailed discussion of scientific contributions to recognition of'sentience' in animals; Alasdair Macintyre, Dependent Rational
Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues {Chicago, Open Court, 2001), for an introduction to
work in philosophy on the human and the animal that seeks to take into account these contn"butions,
and individuality; Philip Low et al., The Cambridge Declaration on Consciausness, Francis Crick
Memorial Conference (7 July 2012), http://fcmconference.org./img/Cambridge DeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf, on consciousness in animals; Barbara Smuts, 'Reflections', in J. M. Coetzee, The
Lives ofAnimals {Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1999), I 07-22, on relationships between
individual human beings and individual animals, and on human-animal intersubjectivity.
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particular interest to science, in part because a young song sparrow comes to
sing a song that is special not just to its kind but to its individual throat and
tongue-rather like the language of each of us.
I left the song sparrow to do its own work in the book, and did not spell
out all the reasons for the choice of this creature rather than another to compare with a child. The song sparrow presented itself, not exotic, as common as
a child. Its smallness sat with the smallness of the child. It was a dependable
example because well known, like the standard laboratory mouse. There was
the echo of its music.
But beyond this, I can suppose also some part of the attractiveness of the
sparrow was its resonance with the comparison of human being and sparrow
in the Gospel of Matthew. Emblems take flight from their origins. Forgetting its origin, I had remembered the linkage in the form of a saying, 'Not a
sparrow that falls but the eye of God is upon it', as in the refrain of the folk
hymn that Mahalia Jackson and the blues singer Ethel Waters made a signature piece:
Why should I feel discouraged?
Why should the shadows come?
Why should my heart be lonely,
And long for heav'n and home?
I sing because I'm happy.
I sing because I'm free.
His eye is on the sparrow
And I know He watches me.3 9

Jt: you go to the original in the Gospel, there will be found a comparison but
not an equation. The actual words can be something of a surprise:
A:re not two sparrows sold for a farthing? And one of them shall not fall on the
ground without your Father. But the very hairs of your head are all numbered.
Fear ye not therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows..o

A line is drawn between the sparrow and the human being, at least to begin
with (as in fact we do). The translators' farthing was the smallest coin, a quarter of a penny (and I recall that when I first saw a modem farthing, before
decimalization, it was stamped with the image of a small bird). An a fortiori

" Civilla D. Martin and Charles H. Gabriel, His Eye is on the Sparrow (New York, Hope Publishing,
1905); Donna Britt, Amazingly. an American in Paris, Washington Post (1 March 1977), D 1, 06; H. C.
Boyer, 'Commentary', in Mahalia Jackson Gospels, Spirituals, and Hymns {Columbia 47084, 1991),
25; Laurraine Goreau, Just Mahalia, Baby (Waco, TX, Word Books, 1975), 181, 561; Ethel Waters
with Charles Samuels, His Eye ls 011 the Sparrow: An Autobiography {Garden City, NY, Doubleday,
1951).
Matthew 10:29-31 (King James).
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case builds on an image of the least. One sparrow was not worth even the
smallest coin, in the market.
There is a further tension in the original. Every hair, every detail oflife is
significant; but there is more than a hint of determinism within a concern that
would value us to the point of counting the hairs on our head. Again, like the
line between sparrow and human being, we may think this not inappropriate
as a reflection of our situation. The limit on what we can do and be, the fact
that we are in systems, is part of what makes a scientist of all of us. Shakespeare plays on all this when Hamlet, going forward at the end and presenting
us with decision at last, individual decision, famously remarks to Horatio,
' There's a special providence in the fall of a sparrow' .41
But I think that as the image of the sparrow has come down, it has more
and more represented one of no importance becoming of transcendent importance. It had appeared long before the Gospel comparison, in the Psalms-the
altar of God a nesting place for the sparrow. 42 Those who first sang 'His eye
is on the sparrow' included many who knew what it was to be properties, fungible units in a system. Even the hard words of the Gospel shift to the single
sparrow before returning to the many-there are 'two sparrows' bundled and
sold for a farthing; it is ' one ' who shall not fall. And the providence that Hamlet saw in the 'fall of a sparrow' was a special providence.
For me as for others, including the blues singers who returned to it so
often, the image blends with the extraordinary statement of human equality and individual value further along in the Gospel of Matthew,41 which we
have seen quoted already. It is a radical passage, of which I think the sparrow can be taken as an emblem. It carries on the oldest prophetic ' tradition
and demands what seems impossible. It is still today a source of that side of
the political spectrum we call individualistic. It is read around the globe, in
unlikely places, by Christian and non-Christian, by scientist and non-scientist.
And, it must be said, it can have been a source of the kind of totalitarianism
that begins in an effort to realize it, before closing into the total. It addresses
both action and inaction, commission and omission, doing with the fiand and
staying the hand, almost as if in anticipation of modem dilemmas. There is
hierarchy in it, a 'least'. But then something happens, and happens to ' one'.
The words are worth reading, for the first time, or again. They end:
I was an hungred, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no
drink: I was a stranger, and ye took me not in: naked, and ye clothed me not:
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sick, and in prison, and ye visited me not. Then shall they also answer him,
saying, Lord, when saw we thee an hungred, or athirst, or a stranger, or naked,
or sick, or in prison, and did not minister unto thee? Then shall he answer
them, saying, Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the
least of these, ye did it not to me.

One of no importance, the least, can become of transcendent importance.

